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Abstract
In recent years, constrained optimization has become increasingly relevant to the machine learning community,
with applications including Neyman-Pearson classification, robust optimization, and fair machine learning. A natural
approach to constrained optimization is to optimize the Lagrangian, but this is not guaranteed to work in the non-
convex setting, and, if using a first-order method, cannot cope with non-differentiable constraints (e.g. constraints on
rates or proportions).
The Lagrangian can be interpreted as a two-player game played between a player who seeks to optimize over
the model parameters, and a player who wishes to maximize over the Lagrange multipliers. We propose a non-zero-
sum variant of the Lagrangian formulation that can cope with non-differentiable—even discontinuous—constraints,
which we call the “proxy-Lagrangian”. The first player minimizes external regret in terms of easy-to-optimize “proxy
constraints”, while the second player enforces the original constraints by minimizing swap regret.
For this new formulation, as for the Lagrangian in the non-convex setting, the result is a stochastic classifier. For
both the proxy-Lagrangian and Lagrangian formulations, however, we prove that this classifier, instead of having
unbounded size, can be taken to be a distribution over no more than m + 1 models (where m is the number of
constraints). This is a significant improvement in practical terms.
1 Introduction
We consider the general problem of inequality constrained optimization, in which we wish to find a set of parameters
θ ∈ Θ minimizing an objective function subject tom functional constraints:
min
θ∈Θ
g0 (θ) (1)
s.t. ∀i ∈ [m] .gi (θ) ≤ 0
To highlight some of the challenges that arise in non-convex constrained optimization, consider the specific example
of constraining a fairness metric. We cast the fairness problem as that of minimizing some empirical loss subject to
∗acotter@google.com
†heinrichj@google.com
‡sridharan@cs.cornell.edu
1
one or more fairness constraints. One of the simplest examples of such is the following:
min
θ∈Θ
1
|S|
∑
x,y∈S
ℓ (f (x; θ) , y) (2)
s.t.
1
|S|
∑
x∈Smin
1f(x;θ)>0 ≥
0.8
|S|
∑
x∈S
1f(x;θ)>0
Here, f (·; θ) is a classification function with parameters θ, S is the training dataset, and Smin ⊆ S represents a mi-
nority population. The constraint represents a version of the so-called “80% rule” [e.g. Biddle, 2005, Vuolo and Levy,
2013], and forces the resulting classifier to make at least 80% of its positive predictions on the minority population—
Goh et al. [2016] and Narasimhan [2018] discuss a number of useful constraints that are formulated similarly, both
on fairness and non-fairness metrics. Unfortunately, several serious challenges arise when we attempt to optimize this
problem:
1. The constraint is data-dependent, and could therefore be very expensive to check.
2. The classification function f may be a badly-behaving function of θ (e.g. a deep neural network), resulting in
non-convex objective and constraint functions.
3. Worse, the constraint is a linear combination of indicators, hence is not even subdifferentiable w.r.t. θ.
Perhaps the most “familiar” technique for constrained optimization is to formulate the Lagrangian:
Definition 1. The Lagrangian L : Θ× Λ→ R of Equation 1 is:
L (θ, λ) := g0 (θ) +
m∑
i=1
λigi (θ)
where Λ ⊆ Rm+ .
and jointly minimize over θ ∈ Θ and maximize over λ ∈ Λ ⊆ Rm+ . By itself, using this formulation doesn’t address
the challenges we identified above, but we will see that, compared to the alternatives (Section 2.1), it’s a good starting
point for an approach that does.
1.1 Dealing with non-Convexity
Optimizing the Lagrangian can be interpreted as playing a two player zero-sum game: the first player chooses θ to min-
imizeL (θ, λ), and the second player chooses λ to maximize it. The essential difficulty is that, without strong duality—
equivalently, unless the minimax theorem holds, giving that minθ∈Θmaxλ∈Λ L (θ, λ) = maxλ∈Λminθ∈ΘL (θ, λ)—
then the θ-player, who is working on the primal (minimax) problem, and the λ-player, who is working on the dual
(maximin) problem, might fail to converge to a solution satisfying both players simultaneously (i.e. a pure Nash
equilibrium).
If Equation 1 is a convex optimization problem and the action spaces Θ and Λ are compact and convex, then the
minimax theorem holds [von Neumann, 1928], and optimizing the Lagrangian will work. Otherwise it might not, and
in fact it’s quite easy to construct a counterexample: Figure 1 shows a case in which a pure Nash equilibrium of the
Lagrangian game does not exist. For this reason, the standard approach for handling non-convex machine learning
problems, i.e. pretending that the problem is convex and using a stochastic first order algorithm anyway, should not
be expected to reliably converge to a pure Nash equilibrium—even on a problem as trivial as that in Figure 1—since
there may be none for it to converge to.
Under general conditions, however, even when there is no pure Nash equilibrium, a mixed equilibrium (i.e. a pair of
distributions over θ and λ) does exist. Such an equilibrium defines a stochastic classifier: upon receiving an example x
to classify, we would sample θ from its equilibrium distribution, and then evaluate the classification function f (x; θ).
Furthermore, and this is our first main contribution, this equilibrium can be taken to consist of a discrete distribution
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over at most m + 1 distinct θs (m being the number of constraints), and a single non-random λ. This is a crucial
improvement in practical terms, since a machine learning model consisting of e.g. a distribution over thousands (or
more) of deep neural networks—or worse, a continuous distribution—would likely be so unwieldy as to be unusable.
1.2 Introducing Proxy Constraints
Figure 1: The plotted rectangular region is the domain Θ,
the contours are those of the strictly concaveminimization
objective function g0, and the shaded triangle is the feasible
region determined by the three linear inequality constraints
g1, . . . , g3. The red dot is the optimal feasible point. The
Lagrangian L (θ, λ) is strictly concave in θ for any choice
of λ, so the optimal choice(s) for the θ-player will always
lie on the four corners of the plotted rectangle. However,
these points are infeasible, and therefore suboptimal for the
λ-player.
Most real-world machine learning implementations use
first-order methods (even on non-convex problems, e.g.
DNNs). To use such a method, however, one must
have gradients, and gradients are unavailable for non-
differentiable constraints like that in the fairness exam-
ple of Equation 2, or in the myriad of other situations in
which one wishes to constrain counts or proportions in-
stead of smooth losses (e.g. recall, coverage or churn as
in Goh et al. [2016]). In all of these cases, the constraint
functions are piecewise-constant, so their gradients are
zero almost everywhere, and a gradient-based method
cannot be expected to succeed.
The obvious solution is to use a surrogate. For example,
we might consider replacing the indicators of Equation 2
with sigmoids, and then optimizing the Lagrangian. This
solves the differentiability problem, but introduces a new
one: a (mixed) Nash equilibrium would correspond to
a solution satisfying the sigmoid-relaxed constraint, in-
stead of the actual constraint. Interestingly, it turns out
that we can seek to satisfy the original un-relaxed con-
straint, even while using a surrogate. Our proposal is motivated by the observation that, while differentiating the
Lagrangian (Definition 1) w.r.t. θ requires differentiating the constraint functions gi (θ), to differentiate it w.r.t. λ we
only need to evaluate them. Hence, a surrogate is only necessary for the θ-player; the λ-player can continue to use the
original constraint functions.
We refer to a surrogate that is used by only one of the two players as a “proxy”, and introduce the notion of “proxy
constraints” by taking g˜i (θ) to be a sufficiently-smooth upper bound on gi (θ) for i ∈ [m], and formulating two
functions that we call “proxy-Lagrangians”:
Definition 2. Given proxy constraint functions g˜i (θ) ≥ gi (θ) for i ∈ [m], the proxy-LagrangiansLθ,Lλ : Θ×Λ→ R
of Equation 1 are:
Lθ (θ, λ) :=λ1g0 (θ) +
m∑
i=1
λi+1 g˜i (θ)
Lλ (θ, λ) :=
m∑
i=1
λi+1gi (θ)
where Λ := ∆m+1 ∋ λ is the (m+ 1)-dimensional simplex.
As one might expect, the θ-player wishes to minimize Lθ (θ, λ), while the λ-player wishes to maximizeLλ (θ, λ). No-
tice that the g˜is are only used by the θ-player. Intuitively, the λ-player chooses howmuch to weigh the proxy constraint
functions, but—and this is the key to our proposal—does so in such a way as to satisfy the original constraints.
Unfortunately, because the two players are optimizing different functions, this is a non-zero-sum game, and finding
a (mixed) Nash equilibrium of such games is known to be PPAD-complete even in the finite setting [Chen and Deng,
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2006]. We prove, however, that a weaker type of equilibrium (a Φ-correlated equilibrium [Rakhlin et al., 2011], i.e. a
joint distribution over θ and λ w.r.t. which neither player can improve)—one that we can find efficiently—suffices to
guarantee a nearly-optimal and nearly-feasible solution to Equation 1 in expectation.
1.3 Contributions
We first focus on the standard Lagrangian formulation, in the non-convex setting. In Section 3, we provide an algorithm
that, given access to an approximate Bayesian optimization oracle, finds a stochastic classifier that, in expectation, is
provably approximately feasible and optimal. Many previous authors have approached constrained optimization using
similar techniques (see Section 2)—our main contribution is to show how such a classifier can be efficiently “shrunk”
to one that is at least as good, but is supported on onlym+ 1 solutions.
Our next major contribution is the introduction of the proxy-Lagrangian formulation, which allows us to optimize
constrained problems with extremely general (even non-differentiable) constraints. In Section 4, we prove that a
particular type of Φ-correlated equilibrium results in a stochastic classifier that is feasible and optimal, and go on to
provide a novel algorithm that converges to such an equilibrium. Interestingly, to get the “right” sort of equilibrium,
the θ-player needs only minimize the usual external regret, but the λ-player must minimize the swap regret. While
the resulting distribution is supported on a large number of (θ, λ) pairs, applying the same “shrinking” procedure as
before yields a distribution over onlym+ 1 θs that is at least as good as the original.
Finally, in Section 5, we tie everything together by describing an end-to-end recipe for provably solving a non-convex
constrained optimization problem with potentially non-differentiable constraints, yielding a stochastic model that is
a supported on at most m + 1 solutions. In practice, one would use SGD instead of an oracle, which results in an
efficient procedure that can be easily plugged-in to existing workflows, as is experimentally verified in Section 6.
2 Related Work
The interpretation of constrained optimization as a two-player game has a long history: Arora et al. [2012] sur-
veys some such work, and there are several more recent examples [e.g. Kearns et al., 2017, Narasimhan, 2018,
Agarwal et al., 2018]. In particular, Agarwal et al. [2018] propose an algorithm for fair classification that is very
similar to the Lagrangian-based approach that we outline in Section 3—the main differences are our introduction
of “shrinking”, and that our setting (Equation 1) is more general. The recent work of Chen et al. [2017] addresses
non-convex robust optimization, i.e. problems of the form:
min
θ∈Θ
max
i∈[m]
gi (θ)
Like both us and Agarwal et al. [2018], they: (i) model such a problem as a two-player game where one player
chooses a mixture of objective functions, and the other player minimizes the loss of the mixture, and (ii) they find a
distribution over solutions rather than a pure equilibrium. These similarities are unsurprising in light of the fact that
robust optimization can be reformulated as constrained optimization via the introduction of a slack variable:
min
θ∈Θ,ξ∈Ξ
ξ (3)
s.t. ∀i ∈ [m] .ξ ≥ gi (θ)
Correspondingly, one can transform a robust problem to a constrained one at the cost of an extra bisection search [e.g.
Christiano et al., 2011, Rakhlin and Sridharan, 2013]. As this relationship suggests, our main contributions can be
adapted to the robust optimization setting. In particular: (i) our proposed shrinking procedure can be applied to
Equation 3 to yield a distribution over only m + 1 solutions, and (ii) one could perform robust optimization over
non-differentiable (even discontinuous) losses using “proxy objectives”, just as we use proxy constraints.
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Algorithm 1 Optimizes the Lagrangian formulation (Definition 1) in the non-convex setting via the use of an approxi-
mate Bayesian optimization oracle Oρ (Definition 3) for the θ-player. The parameter R is the radius of the Lagrange
multiplier space Λ :=
{
λ ∈ Rm+ : ‖λ‖1 ≤ R
}
, and the function ΠΛ projects its argument onto Λ w.r.t. the Euclidean
norm.
OracleLagrangian (R ∈ R+,L : Θ× Λ→ R,Oρ : (Θ→ R)→ Θ, T ∈ N, ηλ ∈ R+):
1 Initialize λ(1) = 0
2 For t ∈ [T ]:
3 Let θ(t) = Oρ
(L (·, λ(t))) // Oracle optimization
4 Let∆
(t)
λ be a gradient of L
(
θ(t), λ(t)
)
w.r.t. λ
5 Update λ(t+1) = ΠΛ
(
λ(t) + ηλ∆
(t)
λ
)
// Projected gradient update
6 Return θ(1), . . . , θ(T ) and λ(1), . . . , λ(T )
2.1 Alternative Approaches
Given the difficulties involved in using a Lagrangian-like formulation for non-convex problems, it’s natural to ask
whether one should instead favor a procedure based on entirely different principles. Unfortunately, the potential
alternatives each present their own challenges.
The potential complexity of the constraints all but rules out approaches based on projections (e.g. projected
SGD) or optimization of constrained subproblems (e.g. Frank-Wolfe, as in Hazan and Kale [2012], Jaggi [2013],
Garber and Hazan [2013]). Similarly, attempting to penalize violations [e.g. Arora et al., 2012, Rakhlin and Sridharan,
2013, Mahdavi et al., 2012, Cotter et al., 2016], for example by adding γmaxi∈[m]max {0, gi (θ)} to the objective,
where γ ∈ R+ is a hyperparameter, and optimizing the resulting problem using a first order method, fails if the
constraint functions are non-differentiable. Even if they are, they may still be data-dependent, so evaluating gi, or
even determining whether it is positive (as is necessary for such techniques, due to the max with 0), requires enu-
merating over the entire dataset. Hence, unlike the Lagrangian and proxy-Lagrangian formulations, such “penalized”
formulations are incompatible with the use of a computationally-cheap stochastic optimizer.
In response to the idea of proxy constraints, it’s natural to ask “why not just relax the constraints for both players, in-
stead of just the θ-player?”. This is indeed a popular approach, having been proposed e.g. for Neyman-Pearson classifi-
cation [Davenport et al., 2010, Gasso et al., 2011], more general rate metrics [Goh et al., 2016], and AUC [Eban et al.,
2017]. The answer is that in many cases, particularly when constraints are data dependent, they represent real-world
restrictions on how the learned model is permitted to behave. For example, the “80% rule” of Equation 2 can be found
in the HOPA Act of 1995 [Wikipedia, 2018], and it requires an 80% threshold in terms of the number of positive
predictions—not a relaxation—which is precisely the target that the proxy-Lagrangian approach will attempt to hit.
This point, in turn, raises the question of generalization: satisfying the correct un-relaxed constraints on training data
does not necessarily mean that they will be satisfied at evaluation time. This issue is outside the scope of this paper, but
is vital. For certain specific applications, the post-training correction approach ofWoodworth et al. [2017] can improve
generalization performance, and Cotter et al. [2018]’s more recent proposal (which is based on our proxy-Lagrangian
formulation) can be applied more generally, but there is still room for future work.
3 Starting Point: Lagrangian Optimization
Our ultimate interest is in constrained optimization, so before we present our proposed algorithm for optimizing the
Lagrangian (Definition 1) in the non-convex setting, we will characterize the relationship between an approximate
Nash equilibrium of the Lagrangian game, and a nearly-optimal nearly-feasible solution to the original constrained
problem (Equation 1):
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Theorem 1. Define Λ :=
{
λ ∈ Rm+ : ‖λ‖1 ≤ R
}
, and let θ(1), . . . , θ(T ) ∈ Θ and λ(1), . . . , λ(T ) ∈ Λ be sequences of
parameter vectors and Lagrange multipliers that comprise an approximate mixed Nash equilibrium, i.e.:
max
λ∗∈Λ
1
T
T∑
t=1
L
(
θ(t), λ∗
)
− inf
θ∗∈Θ
1
T
T∑
t=1
L
(
θ∗, λ(t)
)
≤ ǫ
Define θ¯ as a random variable for which θ¯ = θ(t) with probability 1/T , and let λ¯ :=
(∑T
t=1 λ
(t)
)
/T . Then θ¯ is
nearly-optimal in expectation:
Eθ¯
[
g0
(
θ¯
)] ≤ inf
θ∗∈Θ:∀i.gi(θ∗)≤0
g0 (θ
∗) + ǫ
and nearly-feasible:
max
i∈[m]
Eθ¯
[
gi
(
θ¯
)] ≤ ǫ
R− ∥∥λ¯∥∥
1
(4)
Additionally, if there exists a θ′ ∈ Θ that satisfies all of the constraints with margin γ (i.e. gi (θ′) ≤ −γ for all i ∈ [m]),
then: ∥∥λ¯∥∥
1
≤ ǫ+Bg0
γ
where Bg0 ≥ supθ∈Θ g0 (θ)− infθ∈Θ g0 (θ) is a bound on the range of the objective function g0.
Proof. This is a special case of Theorem 3 and Lemma 6 in Appendix A.
This theorem has a few differences from the more typically-encountered equivalence between Nash equilibria and
optimal feasible solutions in the convex setting. First, it characterizes mixed equilibria, in that uniformly sampling
from the sequences θ(t) and λ(t) can be interpreted as defining distributions over Θ and Λ. A convexity assumption
would enable us to eliminate this added complexity by appealing to Jensen’s inequality to replace these sequences with
their averages. Second, for the technical reason that we require compact domains in order to prove convergence rates
(below), Λ is taken to consist only of sets of Lagrange multipliers with bounded 1-norm 1.
Finally, as a consequence of this second point, the feasibility guarantee of Equation 4 only holds if the Lagrange
multipliers are, on average, smaller than the maximum 1-norm radius R. Thankfully, as is shown by the final result of
Theorem 1, if there exists a point satisfying the constraints with some margin γ, then there will exist Rs that are large
enough to guarantee feasibility to within O(ǫ).
Our proposed algorithm (Algorithm 1) requires an oracle that performs approximate non-convex minimization, sim-
ilarly to Chen et al. [2017]’s algorithm for robust optimization and Agarwal et al. [2018]’s for fair classification (the
latter reference uses the terminology “best response”):
Definition 3. A ρ-approximate Bayesian optimization oracle is a functionOρ : (Θ→ R)→ Θ for which:
f (Oρ (f)) ≤ inf
θ∗∈Θ
f (θ∗) + ρ
for any f : Θ → R that can be written as a nonnegative linear combination of the objective and constraint functions
g0, g1, . . . , gm.
The θ-player uses this oracle, and the λ-player uses projected gradient ascent. Notice that, unlike the oracle of
Chen et al. [2017], which provides a multiplicative approximation, Oρ provides an additive approximation. Algo-
rithm 1’s convergence rate is:
Lemma 1. Suppose that Λ and R are as in Theorem 1, and define the upper boundB∆ ≥ maxt∈[T ]
∥∥∥∆(t)λ ∥∥∥
2
.
1In Appendix A, this is generalized to p-norms.
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If we run Algorithm 1 with the step size ηλ := R/B∆
√
2T , then the result satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1 for:
ǫ = ρ+RB∆
√
2
T
where ρ is the error associated with the oracle Oρ.
Proof. In Appendix C.3.
Combined with Theorem 1, we therefore have that if R is sufficiently large, then Algorithm 1 will converge to a
distribution over Θ that is, in expectation,O(ρ)-far from being optimal and feasible at a O(1/
√
T ) rate, where ρ is as
in Definition 3.
3.1 Shrinking
Aside from the unrealistic oracle assumption (which will be partially addressed in Section 4), the main disadvantage
of Algorithm 1 is that it results in a mixture of T models, which presumably would be far too many to use in practice.
However, much smaller Nash equilibria exist:
Lemma 2. IfΘ is a compact Hausdorff space,Λ is compact, and the objective and constraint functions g0, g1, . . . , gm
are continuous, then the Lagrangian game (Definition 1) has a mixed Nash equilibrium pair (θ, λ) where θ is a random
variable supported on at mostm+ 1 elements of Θ, and λ is non-random.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 5 in Appendix B.
Of course, the mere existence of such an equilibrium is insufficient—we need to be able to find it, and Algorithm 1
manifestly does not. Thankfully, we can re-formulate the problem of finding the optimal ǫ-feasible mixture of the
θ(t)s as a linear program (LP) that can be solved to “shrink” the support set. We must first evaluate the objective and
constraint functions for every θ(t), yielding a T -dimensional vector of objective function values, and m such vectors
of constraint function evaluations, which are then used to specify the LP:
Lemma 3. Let θ(1), θ(2), . . . , θ(T ) ∈ Θ be a sequence of T “candidate solutions” of Equation 1. Define ~g0, ~gi ∈ RT
such that (~g0)t = g0
(
θ(t)
)
and (~gi)t = gi
(
θ(t)
)
for i ∈ [m], and consider the linear program:
min
p∈∆T
〈p, ~g0〉
s.t. ∀i ∈ [m] . 〈p, ~gi〉 ≤ ǫ
where ∆T is the T -dimensional simplex. Then every vertex p∗ of the feasible region—in particular an optimal one—
has at mostm∗ + 1 ≤ m+ 1 nonzero elements, wherem∗ is the number of active 〈p∗, ~gi〉 ≤ ǫ constraints.
Proof. In Appendix B.
This result suggests a two-phase approach to optimization. In the first phase, we apply Algorithm 1, yielding a
sequence of iterates for which the uniform distribution over the θ(t)s is approximately feasible and optimal. We then
apply the procedure of Lemma 3 to find the best distribution over these iterates, which in particular is guaranteed to
be no worse than the uniform distribution, and is supported on at mostm+ 1 iterates. We’ll expand upon this further
in Section 5.
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Algorithm 2 Optimizes the proxy-Lagrangian formulation (Definition 2) in the convex setting, with the θ-player
minimizing external regret, and the λ-player minimizing swap regret. The fixM operation on line 3 results in a
stationary distribution of M (i.e. a λ ∈ Λ such that Mλ = λ, which can be derived from the top eigenvector). The
functionΠΘ projects its argument onto Θ w.r.t. the Euclidean norm.
StochasticProxyLagrangian
(Lθ,Lλ : Θ×∆m+1 → R, T ∈ N, ηθ, ηλ ∈ R+):
1 Initialize θ(1) = 0, andM (1) ∈ R(m+1)×(m+1) withMi,j = 1/ (m+ 1) // Assumes 0 ∈ Θ
2 For t ∈ [T ]:
3 Let λ(t) = fixM (t) // Stationary distribution ofM (t)
4 Let ∆ˇ
(t)
θ be a stochastic subgradient of Lθ
(
θ(t), λ(t)
)
w.r.t. θ
5 Let∆
(t)
λ be a stochastic gradient of Lλ
(
θ(t), λ(t)
)
w.r.t. λ
6 Update θ(t+1) = ΠΘ
(
θ(t) − ηθ∆ˇ(t)θ
)
// Projected SGD update
7 Update M˜ (t+1) = M (t) ⊙ . exp
(
ηλ∆
(t)
λ
(
λ(t)
)T)
// ⊙ and . exp are element-wise
8 ProjectM
(t+1)
:,i = M˜
(t+1)
:,i /
∥∥∥M˜ (t+1):,i ∥∥∥
1
for i ∈ [m+ 1] // Column-wise projection w.r.t. KL divergence
9 Return θ(1), . . . , θ(T ) and λ(1), . . . , λ(T )
4 Proxy-Lagrangian Optimization
While the Lagrangian formulation can be used to solve constrained problems in the form of Equation 1, Algorithm 1
isn’t actually implementable, due to its reliance on an oracle. If one wished to apply it in practice, one would need
to replace the oracle with something else, and for large-scale machine learning problems, “something else” is over-
whelmingly likely to be SGD [Robbins and Monro, 1951, Zinkevich, 2003] or another first-order stochastic algorithm
(e.g. AdaGrad [Duchi et al., 2011] or ADAM [Kingma and Ba, 2014]).
This leads to the issue we raised in Section 1.2: for non-differentiable constraints like those in the fairness example
of Equation 2, we cannot compute gradients, and therefore cannot use a first-order algorithm. “Fixing” this issue by
replacing the constraints with differentiable surrogates introduces a new difficulty: solutions to the resulting problem
will satisfy the surrogate constraints, rather than the actual constraints.
The proxy-Lagrangian formulation of Definition 2 sidesteps this issue by using a non-zero-sum two-player game. The
λ-player chooses how much the θ-player should penalize the (differentiable) proxy constraints, but does so in such
a way as to satisfy the original constraints. Unfortunately, since the proxy-Lagrangian game is non-zero-sum, we
cannot expect to find a Nash equilibrium, at least not efficiently. However, the analogous result to Theorem 1 requires
a weaker type of equilibrium: a joint distribution over Θ and Λ w.r.t. which the θ-player can only make a negligible
improvement compared to the best constant strategy, and the λ-player compared to the best action-swapping strategy
(this is a particular type of Φ-correlated equilibrium [Rakhlin et al., 2011]):
Theorem 2. Define M as the set of all left-stochastic (m+ 1) × (m+ 1) matrices, Λ := ∆m+1 as the (m+ 1)-
dimensional simplex, and assume that each g˜i upper bounds the corresponding gi. Let θ
(1), . . . , θ(T ) ∈ Θ and
λ(1), . . . , λ(T ) ∈ Λ be sequences satisfying:
1
T
T∑
t=1
Lθ
(
θ(t), λ(t)
)
− inf
θ∗∈Θ
1
T
T∑
t=1
Lθ
(
θ∗, λ(t)
)
≤ǫθ
max
M∗∈M
1
T
T∑
t=1
Lλ
(
θ(t),M∗λ(t)
)
− 1
T
T∑
t=1
Lλ
(
θ(t), λ(t)
)
≤ǫλ
Define θ¯ as a random variable for which θ¯ = θ(t) with probability λ
(t)
1 /
∑T
s=1 λ
(s)
1 , and let λ¯ :=
(∑T
t=1 λ
(t)
)
/T .
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Then θ¯ is nearly-optimal in expectation:
Eθ¯
[
g0
(
θ¯
)] ≤ inf
θ∗∈Θ:∀i.g˜i(θ∗)≤0
g0 (θ
∗) +
ǫθ + ǫλ
λ¯1
(5)
and nearly-feasible:
max
i∈[m]
Eθ¯
[
gi
(
θ¯
)] ≤ ǫλ
λ¯1
(6)
Additionally, if there exists a θ′ ∈ Θ that satisfies all of the proxy constraints with margin γ (i.e. g˜i (θ′) ≤ −γ for all
i ∈ [m]), then:
λ¯1 ≥ γ − ǫθ − ǫλ
γ +Bg0
where Bg0 ≥ supθ∈Θ g0 (θ)− infθ∈Θ g0 (θ) is a bound on the range of the objective function g0.
Proof. This is a special case of Theorem 4 and Lemma 7 in Appendix A.
Notice that while Equation 6 guarantees feasibility w.r.t. the original constraints, the comparator in Equation 5 is
feasible w.r.t. the proxy constraints. Hence, the overall guarantee is no better than what we would achieve if we
took gi := g˜i for all i ∈ [m], and optimized the Lagrangian as in Section 3. However, as will be demonstrated
experimentally in Section 6.2, because the feasible region w.r.t. the original constraints is larger (perhaps significantly
so) than that w.r.t. the proxy constraints, the proxy-Lagrangian approach has more “room” to find a better solution in
practice.
One key difference between this result and Theorem 1 is that the R parameter is absent. Instead, its role, and that of∥∥λ¯∥∥
1
, is played by the first coordinate of λ¯. Inspection of Definition 2 reveals that, if one or more of the constraints are
violated, then the λ-player would prefer λ1 to be zero, whereas if they are satisfied (with some margin), then it would
prefer λ1 to be one. In other words, the first coordinate of λ
(t) encodes the λ-player’s belief about the feasibility of
θ(t), for which reason θ(t) is weighted by λ
(t)
1 in the density defining θ¯.
Algorithm 2 is motivated by the observation that, while Theorem 2 only requires that the θ(t) sequence suffer low
external regret w.r.t. Lθ
(·, λ(t)), the condition on the λ(t) sequence is stronger, requiring it to suffer low swap re-
gret [Blum and Mansour, 2007]. Hence, the θ-player uses SGD to minimize external regret, while the λ-player uses a
swap-regret minimization algorithm of the type proposed by Gordon et al. [2008], yielding the convergence guarantee:
Lemma 4. Suppose that Θ is a compact convex set, M and Λ are as in Theorem 2, and that the objective and
proxy constraint functions g0, g˜1, . . . , g˜m are convex (but not g1, . . . , gm). Define the three upper bounds BΘ ≥
maxθ∈Θ ‖θ‖2, B∆ˇ ≥ maxt∈[T ]
∥∥∥∆ˇ(t)θ ∥∥∥
2
, and B∆ ≥ maxt∈[T ]
∥∥∥∆(t)λ ∥∥∥
∞
.
If we run Algorithm 2 with the step sizes ηθ := BΘ/B∆ˇ
√
2T and ηλ :=
√
(m+ 1) ln (m+ 1) /TB2∆, then the result
satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2 for:
ǫθ =2BΘB∆ˇ
√
1 + 16 ln 2δ
T
ǫλ =2B∆
√
2 (m+ 1) ln (m+ 1)
(
1 + 16 ln 2δ
)
T
with probability 1− δ over the draws of the stochastic (sub)gradients.
Proof. In Appendix C.3.
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Algorithm 2 is designed for the convex setting (except for the gis), for which reason it uses SGD for the θ-updates.
However, this convexity requirement is not innate to our approach: it’s straightforward to design an oracle-based
algorithm that, like Algorithm 1, doesn’t require convexity 2. Our reason for presenting the SGD-based algorithm,
instead of the oracle-based one, is that the purpose of proxy constraints is to substitute optimizable constraints for
unoptimizable ones, and there is no need to do so if you have an oracle.
4.1 Shrinking
It turns out that the same existence result that we provided for the Lagrangian game (Lemma 2)—of a Nash
equilibrium—holds for the proxy-Lagrangian:
Lemma 5. If Θ is a compact Hausdorff space and the objective, constraint and proxy constraint functions
g0, g1, . . . , gm, g˜1, . . . , g˜m are continuous, then the proxy-Lagrangian game (Definition 2) has a mixed Nash
equilibrium pair (θ, λ) where θ is a random variable supported on at mostm+1 elements ofΘ, and λ is non-random.
Proof. In Appendix B.
Furthermore, the exact same linear programming procedure of Lemma 3 can be applied (with the ~gis being defined in
terms of the original—not proxy—constraints) to yield a solution with support size m + 1, and works equally well.
This is easy to verify: since θ¯, as defined in Theorem 2, is a distribution over the θ(t)s, and is therefore feasible for the
LP, the best distribution over the iterates will be at least as good.
5 Overall Procedure
The pieces are now in place to propose a complete two-phase optimization procedure, for both convex and non-
convex problems, with or without proxy constraints. In the first phase, we apply the appropriate algorithm to yield
a distribution over the T “candidates” θ(1), . . . , θ(T ) that is approximately feasible and optimal, according to either
Theorems 1 or 2. Then, in the second phase, we construct ~g0, ~g1, . . . , ~gm ∈ RT by evaluating the objective and
constraint functions for each θ(t), and then optimize the LP of Lemma 3 to find the best distribution over θ(1), . . . , θ(T )
(which will have support size ≤ m + 1). If we take the ǫ parameter to this LP to be either the RHS of Equation 4
in Theorem 1 (for the Lagrangian case), or of Equation 6 in Theorem 2 (for the proxy-Lagrangian case), then the
resulting size-(m+ 1) distribution will have the same guarantees as the original.
Practical Procedure: The approach outlined above provably works, but is still somewhat idealized. In practice, we’ll
dispense with the oracle Oρ—even on non-convex problems—in favor of the “typical” approach: pretending that the
problem is convex, and using SGD (or another cheap stochastic algorithm) for the θ-updates 3. On a non-convex
problem, this has no guarantees, but one would still hope that it would result in a “candidate set” of θ(t)s that contains
enough good solutions to pass on to the LP of Lemma 3. If necessary, this candidate set can first be subsampled to
make it a reasonable size. To choose the ǫ parameter of the LP, we propose using a bisection search to find the smallest
ǫ ≥ 0 for which there exists a feasible solution.
Evaluation: The ultimate result of either of these procedures is a distribution over at most m + 1 distinct θs. If the
underlying problem is one of classification, with f (·; θ) being the scoring function, then this distribution defines a
stochastic classifier: at evaluation time, upon receiving an example x, we would sample θ, and then return f (x; θ). If
a stochastic classifier is not acceptable (as is often the case in real-world applications), then one could heuristically
convert it into a deterministic one, e.g. by weighted averaging or voting, which is made significantly easier by its small
size.
2This is Algorithm 4, with Lemma 11 being its convergence guarantee, both in Appendix C.3.
3In the Lagrangian case, this is Algorithm 3, with Lemma 10 being its convergence guarantee in the convex setting, both in Appendix C.3. In
the proxy-Lagrangian case, this is Algorithm 2.
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Table 1: Error rates on the experiments of Section 6.1. The columns correspond to the four corrupted datasets of
Chen et al. [2017].
Testing Training
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4
Baseline (θ¯) 2.58 2.66 2.01 2.52 1.06 1.45 0.43 1.10
Baseline (θ(T )) 1.77 1.92 1.77 1.75 0.04 0.40 0.01 0.08
Lagrangian (θ¯) 2.04 2.15 1.96 2.04 0.42 0.70 0.30 0.49
Lagrangian (LP) 1.66 1.67 1.63 1.62 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Table 2: Support sizes, test error rates, and “equal opportunity” values for the experiments of Section 6.2. For the
constraints, each reported number is the ratio of the positive prediction rate on positively-labeled members of the
protected class, to the positive prediction rate on the set of all positively-labeled data. The constraints attempt to force
this ratio to be at least 95%—quantities lower than this threshold violate the constraint, and are marked in bold.
Testing Training
Support Error Female Male Black White Female Male Black White
Baseline (θ(T )) 1 14.2% 89.5% 102% 81.6% 101% 88.9% 102% 82.8% 101%
Lagrangian (θ¯) 100 16.3% 114% 97.5% 126% 99.8% 113% 97.8% 121% 99.7%
Lagrangian (LP) 3 15.5% 106% 99.0% 111% 101% 104% 99.4% 105% 101%
Proxy (θ¯) 100 14.4% 94.1% 101% 94.9% 100% 94.7% 101% 94.5% 100%
Proxy (LP) 3 14.2% 94.4% 101% 94.9% 100% 95.0% 101% 95.0% 100%
6 Experiments
We present two experiments: the first, on the robust MNIST problem of Chen et al. [2017], tests the perfor-
mance of the “practical procedure” of Section 5 using the Lagrangian formulation (with the norms of the
Lagrange multipliers being unbounded, i.e. R = ∞), while the second, a fairness problem on the UCI Adult
dataset [Dheeru and Karra Taniskidou, 2017], uses the proxy-Lagrangian formulation. Both were implemented in
TensorFlow 4.
In both cases, the θ and λ-updates both used AdaGrad with the same initial learning rates. In the proxy-Lagrangian
case, however, the λ-update (line 7 of Algorithm 2) was performed in the log domain so that it would be multiplicative.
To choose the initial AdaGrad learning rate, we performed a grid search over powers-of-two, and chose the best model
on a validation set. In all experiments, the optimum was in the interior of the grid.
Our constrained optimization algorithms result in stochastic classifiers, and we report results for both the θ¯ of Theo-
rems 1 or 2 (in the Lagrangian or proxy-Lagrangian cases, respectively), and the optimal distribution found by the LP
of Lemma 3, optimized on the training dataset.
6.1 Robust Optimization
In robust optimization, there are multiple objective functions g1, ..., gm : Θ → R, and the goal is to find a θ ∈
Θ minimizing maxi∈[m] gi (θ). As was discussed in Section 2, this can be re-written as a constrained problem by
introducing a slack variable, as in Equation 3.
The task is the modified MNIST problem created by Chen et al. [2017], which is based on four datasets, each of which
is a version of MNIST that has been corrupted in different ways. One would therefore hope that choosing gi to be an
4Source code: https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/tree/r1.10/tensorflow/contrib/constrained_optimization.
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empirical loss on the ith such dataset, and optimizing the corresponding robust problem, will result in a classifier that
is “robust” to all four types of corruption.
We used a neural network with one 1024-neuron hidden layer, and ReLu activations. The four objective functions were
the cross-entropy losses on the corrupted datasets. All models were trained for 50 000 iterations using a minibatch size
of 100, and a θ(t) was extracted every 500 iterations, yielding a sequence of length T = 100.
Baselines: For our baselines, we trained the neural network over the union of the four datasets. We report two variants:
(i) the “Uniform Distribution Baseline” of Chen et al. [2017] is a stochastic classifier, uniformly sampled over the θ(t)s
(like our θ¯ classifier), and (ii) a non-stochastic classifier taking its parameters from the last iterate θ(T ).
Results: Table 1 lists, for each of the corrupted datasets, the error rates of the compared models on both the training
and testing datasets. Interestingly, although our proposed shrinking procedure is only guaranteed to give a distribution
overm+ 1 solutions, in these experiments it chose only one. Hence, the “Lagrangian (LP)” model of Table 1 is, like
“Baseline (θ(T ))”, non-stochastic.
While we did not quite match the raw performance reported by Chen et al. [2017]’s algorithm, our results, and theirs,
tell similar stories. In particular, we can see that both of our algorithms outperformed their natural baseline equivalents.
In particular, the use of shrinking not only greatly simplified the model, but also significantly improved performance.
6.2 Equal Opportunity
These experiments were performed on the UCI Adult dataset, which consists of census data including 14 features
such as age, gender, race, occupation, and education. The goal was to predict whether income exceeds 50k/year. The
dataset contains 32 561 training examples, from which we split off 20% to form a validation set, and 16 281 testing
examples.
We dropped the “fnlwgt” weighting feature, and processed the remaining features as in Platt [1998], yielding 120
binary features, on which we trained linear models. The objective was to minimize the average hinge loss, subject to
one 95% equal opportunity [Hardt et al., 2016] constraint in the style of Goh et al. [2016] for each “protected class”:
gi was defined such that gi (θ) ≤ 0 iff the positive prediction rate on the set of positively-labeled examples for the
associated class was at least 95% of the positive prediction rate on the set of all positively-labeled examples.
When using proxy constraints, g˜i was taken to be a version of gi with the indicator functions defining the positive
prediction rates replaced with hinge upper bounds. When not using proxy constraints, the indicator-based constraints
were dropped entirely, with these upper bounds being used throughout.
All models were trained for 5 000 iterations with a minibatch size of 100, with a θ(t) being extracted every 50 iterations,
yielding a sequence of length T = 100.
Baseline: The baseline classifier was optimized to simply minimize training hinge loss. Since this problem is uncon-
strained, we took the last iterate θ(T ).
“Best-model” Heuristic: For hyperparameter tuning using a grid search, we needed to choose the “best” model on the
validation set. Due to the presence of constraints, however, the “best” model was not necessarily that with the lowest
validation error. Instead, we used the following heuristic: the models were each ranked in terms of their objective
function value, as well as the magnitude of the ith constraint violation (i.e. max {0, gi (θ)}). The “score” of each
model was then taken to be the maximal such rank, and the model with the lowest score was chosen, with the objective
function serving as a tiebreaker.
Results: Table 2 lists the test error rates, (indicator-based) constraint function values on both the training and testing
datasets, and support sizes of the stochastic classifiers, for each of the compared algorithms. The “LP” versions of
our models, which were found using the shrinking procedure of Lemma 3, uniformly outperformed their θ¯-analogues.
We can see, however, that the generalization issue discussed in Section 2.1 caused the proxy-Lagrangian LP model to
slightly violate the constraints on the testing dataset, despite satisfying them on the training dataset. The non-proxy
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algorithms satisfied all constraints, on both the training and testing datasets, because there was sufficient “room” be-
tween the hinge upper bound that they actually constrained, and the true constraint, to absorb the generalization error.
Inspection of the error rates, however, reveals that the relaxed constraints were so overly-conservative that satisfy-
ing them significantly damaged classification performance. In contrast, our proxy-Lagrangian approach matched the
classification performance of the unconstrained baseline.
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A Proofs of Sub{optimality,feasibility} Guarantees
Theorem 3. (Lagrangian Sub{optimality,feasibility}) Define Λ =
{
λ ∈ Rm+ : ‖λ‖p ≤ R
}
, and consider the La-
grangian of Equation 1 (Definition 1). Suppose that θ ∈ Θ and λ ∈ Λ are random variables such that:
max
λ∗∈Λ
Eθ [L (θ, λ∗)]− inf
θ∗∈Θ
Eλ [L (θ∗, λ)] ≤ ǫ (7)
i.e. θ, λ is an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium. Then θ is ǫ-suboptimal:
Eθ [g0 (θ)] ≤ inf
θ∗∈Θ:∀i∈[m].gi(θ∗)≤0
g0 (θ
∗) + ǫ
Furthermore, if λ is in the interior of Λ, in the sense that
∥∥λ¯∥∥
p
< R where λ¯ := Eλ [λ], then θ is ǫ/
(
R−
∥∥λ¯∥∥
p
)
-
feasible: ∥∥(Eθ [g: (θ)])+∥∥q ≤ ǫR− ∥∥λ¯∥∥
p
where g: (θ) is them-dimensional vector of constraint evaluations, and (·)+ takes the positive part of its argument, so
that
∥∥(Eθ [g: (θ)])+∥∥q is the q-norm of the vector of expected constraint violations.
Proof. First notice that L is linear in λ, so:
max
λ∗∈Λ
Eθ [L (θ, λ∗)]− inf
θ∗∈Θ
L (θ∗, λ¯) ≤ ǫ (8)
Optimality: Choose θ∗ to be the optimal feasible solution in Equation 8, so that gi (θ
∗) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ [m], and also
choose λ∗ = 0, which combined with the definition of L (Definition 1) gives that:
Eθ [g0 (θ)]− g0 (θ∗) ≤ ǫ
which is the optimality claim.
Feasibility: Choose θ∗ = θ in Equation 8. By the definition of L (Definition 1):
max
λ∗∈Λ
m∑
i=1
λ∗iEθ [gi (θ)]−
m∑
i=1
λ¯iEθ [gi (θ)] ≤ ǫ
Then by the definition of a dual norm, Hölder’s inequality, and the assumption that
∥∥λ¯∥∥
p
< R:
R
∥∥(Eθ [g: (θ)])+∥∥q − ∥∥λ¯∥∥p ∥∥(Eθ [g: (θ)])+∥∥q ≤ ǫ
Rearranging terms gives the feasibility claim.
Lemma 6. In the context of Theorem 3, suppose that there exists a θ′ ∈ Θ that satisfies all of the constraints, and
does so with q-norm margin γ, i.e. gi (θ
′) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ [m] and ‖g: (θ′)‖q ≥ γ. Then:
∥∥λ¯∥∥
p
≤ ǫ+ Bg0
γ
where Bg0 ≥ supθ∈Θ g0 (θ)− infθ∈Θ g0 (θ) is a bound on the range of the objective function g0.
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Proof. Starting from Equation 7 (in Theorem 3), and choosing θ∗ = θ′ and λ∗ = 0:
ǫ ≥Eθ [g0 (θ)]− Eλ
[
g0 (θ
′) +
m∑
i=1
λigi (θ
′)
]
ǫ ≥Eθ
[
g0 (θ)− inf
θ′∈Θ
g0 (θ
′)
]
−
(
g0 (θ
′)− inf
θ′∈Θ
g0 (θ
′)
)
+ γ
∥∥λ¯∥∥
p
ǫ ≥ −Bg0 + γ
∥∥λ¯∥∥
p
Solving for
∥∥λ¯∥∥
p
yields the claim.
Theorem 4. (Proxy-Lagrangian Sub{optimality,feasibility}) LetM be the set of all left-stochastic (m+ 1)×(m+ 1)
matrices (i.e. M := {M ∈ R(m+1)×(m+1) : ∀i ∈ [m+ 1] .M:,i ∈ ∆m+1}), and consider the “proxy-Lagrangians”
of Equation 1 (Definition 2). Suppose that θ ∈ Θ and λ ∈ Λ are jointly distributed random variables such that:
Eθ,λ [Lθ (θ, λ)]− inf
θ∗∈Θ
Eλ [Lθ (θ∗, λ)] ≤ǫθ (9)
max
M∗∈M
Eθ,λ [Lλ (θ,M∗λ)]− Eθ,λ [Lλ (θ, λ)] ≤ǫλ
Define λ¯ := Eλ [λ], let (Ω,F , P ) be the probability space, and define a random variable θ¯ such that:
Pr
{
θ¯ ∈ S} =
∫
θ−1(S) λ1 (x) dP (x)∫
Ω λ1 (x) dP (x)
In words, θ¯ is a version of θ that has been resampled with λ1 being treated as an importance weight. In particular
Eθ¯
[
f
(
θ¯
)]
= Eθ,λ [λ1f (θ)] /λ¯1 for any f : Θ→ R. Then θ¯ is nearly-optimal:
Eθ¯
[
g0
(
θ¯
)] ≤ inf
θ∗∈Θ:∀i∈[m].g˜i(θ∗)≤0
g0 (θ
∗) +
ǫθ + ǫλ
λ¯1
and nearly-feasible: ∥∥∥(Eθ¯ [g: (θ¯)])+
∥∥∥
∞
≤ ǫλ
λ¯1
Notice the optimality inequality is weaker than it may appear, since the comparator in this equation is not the optimal
solution w.r.t. the constraints gi, but rather w.r.t. the proxy constraints g˜i.
Proof. Optimality: If we chooseM∗ to be the matrix with its first row being all-one, and all other rows being all-zero,
then Lλ (θ,M∗λ) = 0, which shows that the first term in the LHS of the second line of Equation 9 is nonnegative.
Hence, −Eθ,λ [Lλ (θ, λ)] ≤ ǫλ, so by the definition of Lλ (Definition 2), and the fact that g˜i ≥ gi:
Eθ,λ
[
m∑
i=1
λi+1g˜i (θ)
]
≥ −ǫλ
Notice that Lθ is linear in λ, so the first line of Equation 9, combined with the above result and the definition of Lθ
(Definition 2) becomes:
Eθ,λ [λ1g0 (θ)]− inf
θ∗∈Θ
(
λ¯1g0 (θ
∗) +
m∑
i=1
λ¯i+1g˜i (θ
∗)
)
≤ ǫθ + ǫλ (10)
Choose θ∗ to be the optimal solution that satisfies the proxy constraints g˜, so that g˜i (θ
∗) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ [m]. Then:
Eθ,λ [λ1g0 (θ)]− λ¯1g0 (θ∗) ≤ ǫθ + ǫλ
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which is the optimality claim.
Feasibility: We’ll simplify our notation by defining ℓ1 (θ) := 0 and ℓi+1 (θ) := gi (θ) for i ∈ [m], so that Lλ (θ, λ) =
〈λ, ℓ: (θ)〉. Consider the first term in the LHS of the second line of Equation 9:
max
M∗∈M
Eθ,λ [Lλ (θ,M∗λ)] = max
M∗∈M
Eθ,λ [〈M∗λ, ℓ: (θ)〉]
= max
M∗∈M
Eθ,λ

m+1∑
i=1
m+1∑
j=1
M∗j,iλiℓj (θ)


=
m+1∑
i=1
max
M∗
:,i
∈∆m+1
m+1∑
j=1
Eθ,λ
[
M∗j,iλiℓj (θ)
]
=
m+1∑
i=1
max
j∈[m+1]
Eθ,λ [λiℓj (θ)]
where we used the fact that, since M∗ is left-stochastic, each of its columns is a (m+ 1)-dimensional multinoulli
distribution. For the second term in the LHS of the second line of Equation 9, we can use the fact that ℓ1 (θ) = 0:
Eθ,λ
[
m+1∑
i=2
λiℓi (θ)
]
≤
m+1∑
i=2
max
j∈[m+1]
Eθ,λ [λiℓj (θ)]
Plugging these two results into the second line of Equation 9, the two sums collapse, leaving:
max
i∈[m+1]
Eθ,λ [λ1ℓi (θ)] ≤ ǫλ
The definition of ℓi then yields the feasibility claim.
Lemma 7. In the context of Theorem 4, suppose that there exists a θ′ ∈ Θ that satisfies all of the proxy constraints
with margin γ, i.e. g˜i (θ
′) ≤ −γ for all i ∈ [m]. Then:
λ¯1 ≥ γ − ǫθ − ǫλ
γ +Bg0
where Bg0 ≥ supθ∈Θ g0 (θ)− infθ∈Θ g0 (θ) is a bound on the range of the objective function g0.
Proof. Starting from Equation 10 (in the proof of Theorem 4), and choosing θ∗ = θ′:
Eθ,λ [λ1g0 (θ)]−
(
λ¯1g0 (θ
′) +
m∑
i=1
λ¯i+1 g˜i (θ
′)
)
≤ ǫθ + ǫλ
Since g˜i (θ
′) ≤ −γ for all i ∈ [m]:
ǫθ + ǫλ ≥Eθ,λ [λ1g0 (θ)]− λ¯1g0 (θ′) +
(
1− λ¯1
)
γ
≥Eθ,λ
[
λ1
(
g0 (θ)− inf
θ′∈Θ
g0 (θ
′)
)]
− λ¯1
(
g0 (θ
′)− inf
θ′∈Θ
g0 (θ
′)
)
+
(
1− λ¯1
)
γ
≥− λ¯1Bg0 +
(
1− λ¯1
)
γ
Solving for λ¯1 yields the claim.
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B Proofs of Existence of Sparse Equilibria
Theorem 5. Consider a two player game, played on the compact Hausdorff spaces Θ and Λ ⊆ Rm. Imagine that the
θ-player wishes to minimize Lθ : Θ × Λ → R, and the λ-player wishes to maximize Lλ : Θ × Λ → R, with both of
these functions being continuous in θ and linear in λ. Then there exists a Nash equilibrium θ, λ:
Eθ [Lθ (θ, λ)] = min
θ∗∈Θ
Lθ (θ∗, λ)
Eθ [Lλ (θ, λ)] = max
λ∗∈Λ
Eθ [Lλ (θ, λ∗)]
where θ is a random variable placing nonzero probability mass on at most m + 1 elements of Θ, and λ ∈ Λ is
non-random.
Proof. There are some extremely similar (and in some ways more general) results than this in the game theory litera-
ture [e.g. Bohnenblust et al., 1950, Parthasarathy and Raghavan, 1975], but for our particular (Lagrangian and proxy-
Lagrangian) setting it’s possible to provide a fairly straightforward proof.
To begin with, Glicksberg [1952] gives that there exists a mixed strategy in the form of two random variables θ˜ and λ˜:
Eθ˜,λ˜
[
Lθ
(
θ˜, λ˜
)]
= min
θ∗∈Θ
Eλ˜
[
Lθ
(
θ∗, λ˜
)]
Eθ˜,λ˜
[
Lλ
(
θ˜, λ˜
)]
=max
λ∗∈Λ
Eθ˜
[
Lλ
(
θ˜, λ∗
)]
Since both functions are linear in λ˜, we can define λ := Eλ˜
[
λ˜
]
, and these conditions become:
Eθ˜
[
Lθ
(
θ˜, λ
)]
= min
θ∗∈Θ
Lθ (θ∗, λ) := ℓmin
Eθ˜
[
Lλ
(
θ˜, λ
)]
=max
λ∗∈Λ
Eθ˜
[
Lλ
(
θ˜, λ∗
)]
Let’s focus on the first condition. Let pǫ := Pr
{
Lθ
(
θ˜, λ
)
≥ ℓmin + ǫ
}
, and notice that p1/n must equal zero for
any n ∈ {1, 2, . . . } (otherwise we would contradict the above), implying by the countable additivity of measures
that Pr
{
Lθ
(
θ˜, λ
)
= ℓmin
}
= 1. We therefore assume henceforth, without loss of generality, that the support of θ˜
consists entirely of minimizers of Lθ (·, λ). Let S ⊆ Θ be this support set.
Define G :=
{∇λ˜Lλ (θ′, λ) : θ′ ∈ S}, and take G¯ to be the closure of the convex hull of G. Since
Eθ˜
[
∇λ˜Lλ
(
θ˜, λ
)]
∈ G¯ ⊆ Rm, we can write it as a convex combination of at most m + 1 extreme points of
G¯, or equivalently ofm+ 1 elements ofG. Hence, we can take θ to be a discrete random variable that places nonzero
mass on at mostm+ 1 elements of S, and:
Eθ
[∇λ˜Lλ (θ, λ)] = Eθ˜ [∇λ˜Lλ (θ˜, λ)]
Linearity in λ then implies that Eθ [Lλ (θ, ·)] and Eθ˜
[
Lλ
(
θ˜, ·
)]
are the same function (up to a constant), and therefore
have the same maximizer(s). Correspondingly, θ is supported on S, which contains only minimizers of Lθ (·, λ) by
construction.
Lemma 5. If Θ is a compact Hausdorff space and the objective, constraint and proxy constraint functions
g0, g1, . . . , gm, g˜1, . . . , g˜m are continuous, then the proxy-Lagrangian game (Definition 2) has a mixed Nash
equilibrium pair (θ, λ) where θ is a random variable supported on at mostm+1 elements ofΘ, and λ is non-random.
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Proof. Applying Theorem 5 directly would result in a support size ofm+2, rather than the desiredm+1, since Λ is
(m+ 1)-dimensional. Instead, we define Λ˜ =
{
λ˜ ∈ Rm+ :
∥∥∥λ˜∥∥∥
1
≤ 1
}
as the space containing the last m coordinates
of Λ. Then we can rewrite the proxy-Lagrangian functions L˜θ, L˜λ : Θ× Λ˜→ R as:
L˜θ
(
θ, λ˜
)
=
(
1−
∥∥∥λ˜∥∥∥
1
)
g0 (θ) +
m∑
i=1
λ˜ig˜i (θ)
L˜λ
(
θ, λ˜
)
=
m∑
i=1
λ˜igi (θ)
These functions are linear in λ˜, which is a m-dimensional space, so the conditions of Theorem 5 apply, yielding the
claimed result.
Lemma 3. Let θ(1), θ(2), . . . , θ(T ) ∈ Θ be a sequence of T “candidate solutions” of Equation 1. Define ~g0, ~gi ∈ RT
such that (~g0)t = g0
(
θ(t)
)
and (~gi)t = gi
(
θ(t)
)
for i ∈ [m], and consider the linear program:
min
p∈∆T
〈p, ~g0〉
s.t. ∀i ∈ [m] . 〈p, ~gi〉 ≤ ǫ
where ∆T is the T -dimensional simplex. Then every vertex p∗ of the feasible region—in particular an optimal one—
has at mostm∗ + 1 ≤ m+ 1 nonzero elements, wherem∗ is the number of active 〈p∗, ~gi〉 ≤ ǫ constraints.
Proof. The linear program contains not only the m explicit linearized functional constraints, but also, since p ∈ ∆T ,
the T nonnegativity constraints pt ≥ 0, and the sum-to-one constraint
∑T
t=1 pt = 1.
Since p is T -dimensional, every vertex p∗ of the feasible region must include T active constraints. Lettingm∗ ≤ m be
the number of active linearized functional constraints, and accounting for the sum-to-one constraint, it follows that at
least T −m∗−1 nonnegativity constraints are active, implying that p∗ contains at mostm∗+1 nonzero elements.
C Proofs of Convergence Rates
C.1 Non-Stochastic One-Player Convergence Rates
Theorem 6. (Mirror Descent) Let f1, f2, . . . : Θ→ R be a sequence of convex functions that we wish to minimize on
a compact convex set Θ. Suppose that the “distance generating function”Ψ : Θ→ R+ is nonnegative and 1-strongly
convex w.r.t. a norm ‖·‖ with dual norm ‖·‖∗.
Define the step size η =
√
BΨ/TB2∇ˇ, where BΨ ≥ maxθ∈ΘΨ(θ) is a uniform upper bound on Ψ, and B∇ˇ ≥∥∥∇ˇft (θ(t))∥∥∗ is a uniform upper bound on the norms of the subgradients. Suppose that we perform T iterations of
the following update, starting from θ(1) = argminθ∈ΘΨ(θ):
θ˜(t+1) =∇Ψ∗
(
∇Ψ
(
θ(t)
)
− η∇ˇft
(
θ(t)
))
θ(t+1) =argmin
θ∈Θ
DΨ
(
θ | θ˜(t+1)
)
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where ∇ˇft (θ) ∈ ∂ft(θ(t)) is a subgradient of ft at θ, and DΨ (θ | θ′) := Ψ (θ) − Ψ(θ′) − 〈∇Ψ(θ′), θ − θ′〉 is the
Bregman divergence associated with Ψ. Then:
1
T
T∑
t=1
ft
(
θ(t)
)
− 1
T
T∑
t=1
ft (θ
∗) ≤ 2B∇ˇ
√
BΨ
T
where θ∗ ∈ Θ is an arbitrary reference vector.
Proof. Mirror descent [Nemirovski and Yudin, 1983, Beck and Teboulle, 2003] dates back to 1983, but this particular
statement is taken from Lemma 2 of Srebro et al. [2011].
Corollary 1. (Gradient Descent) Let f1, f2, . . . : Θ→ R be a sequence of convex functions that we wish to minimize
on a compact convex set Θ.
Define the step size η = BΘ/B∇ˇ
√
2T , where BΘ ≥ maxθ∈Θ ‖θ‖2, and B∇ˇ ≥
∥∥∇ˇft (θ(t))∥∥2 is a uniform upper
bound on the norms of the subgradients. Suppose that we perform T iterations of the following update, starting from
θ(1) = argminθ∈Θ ‖θ‖2:
θ(t+1) = ΠΘ
(
θ(t) − η∇ˇft
(
θ(t)
))
where ∇ˇft (θ) ∈ ∂ft(θ(t)) is a subgradient of ft at θ, and ΠΘ projects its argument onto Θ w.r.t. the Euclidean norm.
Then:
1
T
T∑
t=1
ft
(
θ(t)
)
− 1
T
T∑
t=1
ft (θ
∗) ≤ BΘB∇ˇ
√
2
T
where θ∗ ∈ Θ is an arbitrary reference vector.
Proof. Follows from taking Ψ(θ) = ‖θ‖22 /2 in Theorem 6.
Corollary 2. LetM := {M ∈ Rm˜×m˜ : ∀i ∈ [m˜] .M:,i ∈ ∆m˜} be the set of all left-stochastic m˜ × m˜ matrices, and
let f1, f2, . . . :M→ R be a sequence of concave functions that we wish to maximize.
Define the step size η =
√
m˜ ln m˜/TB2
∇ˆ
, where B
∇ˆ
≥
∥∥∥∇ˆft (M (t))∥∥∥
∞,2
is a uniform upper bound on the norms of
the supergradients, and ‖·‖∞,2 :=
√∑m˜
i=1 ‖M:,i‖2∞ is the L∞,2 matrix norm. Suppose that we perform T iterations
of the following update starting from the matrixM (1) with all elements equal to 1/m˜:
M˜ (t+1) =M (t) ⊙ . exp
(
η∇ˆft
(
M (t)
))
M
(t+1)
:,i =M˜
(t+1)
:,i /
∥∥∥M˜ (t+1):,i ∥∥∥
1
where −∇ˆft
(
M (t)
) ∈ ∂ (−ft(M (t))), i.e. ∇ˆft (M (t)) is a supergradient of ft at M (t), and the multiplication and
exponentiation in the first step are performed element-wise. Then:
1
T
T∑
t=1
ft (M
∗)− 1
T
T∑
t=1
ft
(
M (t)
)
≤ 2B
∇ˆ
√
m˜ ln m˜
T
whereM∗ ∈ M is an arbitrary reference matrix.
Proof. DefineΨ :M→ R := m˜ ln m˜+∑i,j∈[m˜]Mi,j lnMi,j as m˜ ln m˜ plus the negative Shannon entropy, applied
to its (matrix) argument element-wise (m˜ ln m˜ is added to make Ψ nonnegative onM). As in the vector setting, the
resulting mirror descent update will be (element-wise) multiplicative.
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The Bregman divergence satisfies:
DΨ (M |M ′) =Ψ (M)−Ψ(M ′)− 〈∇Ψ(M ′),M −M ′〉
= ‖M ′‖1,1 − ‖M‖1,1 +
m˜∑
i=1
DKL
(
M:,i‖M ′:,i
)
(11)
where ‖M‖1,1 =
∑m˜
i=1 ‖M:,i‖1 is the L1,1 matrix norm. This incidentally shows that one projects ontoM w.r.t. DΨ
by projecting each column w.r.t. the KL divergence, i.e. by normalizing the columns.
By Pinsker’s inequality (applied to each column of anM ∈ M):
‖M −M ′‖21,2 ≤ 2
m˜∑
i=1
DKL
(
M:,i‖M ′:,i
)
where ‖M‖1,2 =
√∑m˜
i=1 ‖M:,i‖21 is the L1,2 matrix norm. Substituting this into Equation 11, and using the fact that
‖M‖1,1 = m˜ for allM ∈M, we have that for allM,M ′ ∈ M:
DΨ (M |M ′) ≥ 1
2
‖M −M ′‖21,2
which shows that Ψ is 1-strongly convex w.r.t. the L1,2 matrix norm. The dual norm of the L1,2 matrix norm is the
L∞,2 norm, which is the last piece needed to apply Theorem 6, yielding the claimed result.
Lemma 8. Let Λ := ∆m˜ be the m˜-dimensional simplex, defineM := {M ∈ Rm˜×m˜ : ∀i ∈ [m˜] .M:,i ∈ ∆m˜} as the
set of all left-stochastic m˜× m˜ matrices, and take f1, f2, . . . : Λ → R to be a sequence of concave functions that we
wish to maximize.
Define the step size η =
√
m˜ ln m˜/TB2
∇ˆ
, where B
∇ˆ
≥
∥∥∥∇ˆft (λ(t))∥∥∥
∞
is a uniform upper bound on the∞-norms of
the supergradients. Suppose that we perform T iterations of the following update, starting from the matrixM (1) with
all elements equal to 1/m˜:
λ(t) =fixM (t)
A(t) =
(
∇ˆft
(
λ(t)
))(
λ(t)
)T
M˜ (t+1) =M (t) ⊙ . exp
(
ηA(t)
)
M
(t+1)
:,i =M˜
(t+1)
:,i /
∥∥∥M˜ (t+1):,i ∥∥∥
1
where fixM is a stationary distribution of M (i.e. a λ ∈ Λ such that Mλ = λ—such always exists, since M is
left-stochastic), −∇ˆft
(
λ(t)
) ∈ ∂ (−ft(λ(t))), i.e. ∇ˆft (λ(t)) is a supergradient of ft at λ(t), and the multiplication
and exponentiation of the third step are performed element-wise. Then:
1
T
T∑
t=1
ft
(
M∗λ(t)
)
− 1
T
T∑
t=1
ft
(
λ(t)
)
≤ 2B
∇ˆ
√
m˜ ln m˜
T
whereM∗ ∈ M is an arbitrary left-stochastic reference matrix.
Proof. This algorithm is an instance of that contained in Figure 1 of Gordon et al. [2008].
Define f˜t (M) := ft
(
M (t)λ(t)
)
. Observe that since ∇ˆft
(
λ(t)
)
is a supergradient of ft at λ
(t), andM (t)λ(t) = λ(t):
ft
(
M˜λ(t)
)
≤ft
(
M (t)λ(t)
)
+
〈
∇ˆft
(
λ(t)
)
, M˜λ(t) −M (t)λ(t)
〉
≤ft
(
M (t)λ(t)
)
+A(t) ·
(
M˜ −M (t)
)
22
where the matrix product on the last line is performed element-wise. This shows that A(t) is a supergradient of f˜t at
M (t), from which we conclude that the final two steps of the update are performing the algorithm of Corollary 2, so:
1
T
T∑
t=1
f˜t (M
∗)− 1
T
T∑
t=1
f˜t
(
M (t)
)
≤ 2B
∇ˆ
√
m˜ ln m˜
T
where the B
∇ˆ
of Corollary 2 is a uniform upper bound on the L∞,2 matrix norms of the A
(t)s. However, by the
definition of A(t) and the fact that λ(t) ∈ ∆m˜, we can instead take B
∇ˆ
to be a uniform upper bound on
∥∥∥∇ˆ(t)∥∥∥
∞
.
Substituting the definition of f˜t and again using the fact thatM
(t)λ(t) = λ(t) then yields the claimed result.
C.2 Stochastic One-Player Convergence Rates
Theorem 7. (Stochastic Mirror Descent) Let Ψ, ‖·‖,DΨ and BΨ be as in Theorem 6, and let f1, f2, . . . : Θ→ R be
a sequence of convex functions that we wish to minimize on a compact convex set Θ.
Define the step size η =
√
BΨ/TB2∆ˇ, where B∆ˇ ≥
∥∥∆ˇ(t)∥∥
∗
is a uniform upper bound on the norms of the
stochastic subgradients. Suppose that we perform T iterations of the following stochastic update, starting from
θ(1) = argminθ∈ΘΨ(θ):
θ˜(t+1) = ∇Ψ∗
(
∇Ψ
(
θ(t)
)
− η∆ˇ(t)
)
θ(t+1) = argmin
θ∈Θ
DΨ
(
θ|θ˜(t+1)
)
where E
[
∆ˇ(t) | θ(t)] ∈ ∂ft(θ(t)), i.e. ∆ˇ(t) is a stochastic subgradient of ft at θ(t). Then, with probability 1 − δ over
the draws of the stochastic subgradients:
1
T
T∑
t=1
ft
(
θ(t)
)
− 1
T
T∑
t=1
ft (θ
∗) ≤ 2B∇ˇ
√
2BΨ
(
1 + 16 ln 1δ
)
T
where θ∗ ∈ Θ is an arbitrary reference vector.
Proof. This is nothing more than the usual transformation of a uniform regret guarantee into a stochastic one via the
Hoeffding-Azuma inequality—we include a proof for completeness.
Define the sequence:
f˜t (θ) = ft
(
θ(t)
)
+
〈
∆ˇ(t), θ − θ(t)
〉
Then applying non-stochastic mirror descent to the sequence f˜t will result in exactly the same sequence of iterates θ
(t)
as applying stochastic mirror descent (above) to ft. Hence, by Theorem 6 and the definition of f˜t (notice that we can
take B∇ˇ = B∆ˇ):
1
T
T∑
t=1
f˜t
(
θ(t)
)
− 1
T
T∑
t=1
f˜t (θ
∗) ≤2B∇ˇ
√
BΨ
T
1
T
T∑
t=1
ft
(
θ(t)
)
− 1
T
T∑
t=1
ft (θ
∗) ≤2B∇ˇ
√
BΨ
T
+
1
T
T∑
t=1
(
f˜t (θ
∗)− ft (θ∗)
)
≤2B∇ˇ
√
BΨ
T
+
1
T
T∑
t=1
〈
∆ˇ(t) − ∇ˇft
(
θ(t)
)
, θ∗ − θ(t)
〉
(12)
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where the last step follows from the convexity of the fts. Consider the second term on the RHS. Observe that, since
the ∆ˇ(t)s are stochastic subgradients, each of the terms in the sum is zero in expectation (conditioned on the past), and
the partial sums therefore form a martingale. Furthermore, by Hölder’s inequality:〈
∆ˇ(t) − ∇ˇft
(
θ(t)
)
, θ∗ − θ(t)
〉
≤
∥∥∥∆ˇ(t) − ∇ˇft (θ(t))∥∥∥
∗
∥∥∥θ∗ − θ(t)∥∥∥ ≤ 4B∆ˇ√2BΨ
the last step because
∥∥θ∗ − θ(t)∥∥ ≤ ∥∥θ∗ − θ(1)∥∥+ ∥∥θ(t) − θ(1)∥∥ ≤ 2 supθ∈Θ√2DΨ (θ | θ(1)) ≤ 2√2BΨ, using the
fact that DΨ is 1-strongly convex w.r.t. ‖·‖, and the definition of θ(1). Hence, by the Hoeffding-Azuma inequality:
Pr
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
〈
∆ˇ(t) − ∇ˇft
(
θ(t)
)
, θ∗ − θ(t)
〉
≥ ǫ
}
≤ exp
(
− T ǫ
2
64BΨB2∆ˇ
)
equivalently:
Pr

 1T
T∑
t=1
〈
∆ˇ(t) − ∇ˇft
(
θ(t)
)
, θ∗ − θ(t)
〉
≥ 8B∆ˇ
√
BΨ ln
1
δ
T

 ≤ δ
substituting this into Equation 12, and applying the inequality
√
a+
√
b ≤ √2a+ 2b, yields the claimed result.
Corollary 3. (Stochastic Gradient Descent) Let f1, f2, . . . : Θ → R be a sequence of convex functions that we wish
to minimize on a compact convex set Θ.
Define the step size η = BΘ/B∆ˇ
√
2T , where BΘ ≥ maxθ∈Θ ‖θ‖2, and B∆ˇ ≥
∥∥∆ˇ(t)∥∥
2
is a uniform upper bound
on the norms of the stochastic subgradients. Suppose that we perform T iterations of the following stochastic update,
starting from θ(1) = argminθ∈Θ ‖θ‖2:
θ(t+1) = ΠΘ
(
θ(t) − η∆ˇ(t)
)
where E
[
∆ˇ(t) | θ(t)] ∈ ∂ft(θ(t)), i.e. ∆ˇ(t) is a stochastic subgradient of ft at θ(t), andΠΘ projects its argument onto
Θ w.r.t. the Euclidean norm. Then, with probability 1− δ over the draws of the stochastic subgradients:
1
T
T∑
t=1
ft
(
θ(t)
)
− 1
T
T∑
t=1
ft (θ
∗) ≤ 2BΘB∇ˇ
√
1 + 16 ln 1δ
T
where θ∗ ∈ Θ is an arbitrary reference vector.
Proof. Follows from taking Ψ(θ) = ‖θ‖22 /2 in Theorem 7.
Corollary 4. LetM := {M ∈ Rm˜×m˜ : ∀i ∈ [m˜] .M:,i ∈ ∆m˜} be the set of all left-stochastic m˜ × m˜ matrices, and
let f1, f2, . . . :M→ R be a sequence of concave functions that we wish to maximize.
Define the step size η =
√
m˜ ln m˜/TB2
∆ˆ
, where B∆ˆ ≥
∥∥∥∆ˆ(t)∥∥∥
∞,2
is a uniform upper bound on the norms of the
stochastic supergradients, and ‖·‖∞,2 :=
√∑m˜
i=1 ‖M:,i‖2∞ is the L∞,2 matrix norm. Suppose that we perform T
iterations of the following stochastic update starting from the matrixM (1) with all elements equal to 1/m˜:
M˜ (t+1) =M (t) ⊙ . exp
(
η∆ˆ(t)
)
M
(t+1)
:,i =M˜
(t+1)
:,i /
∥∥∥M˜ (t+1):,i ∥∥∥
1
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where E
[
−∆ˆ(t) |M (t)
]
∈ ∂ (−ft(M (t))), i.e. ∆ˆ(t) is a stochastic supergradient of ft atM (t), and the multiplication
and exponentiation in the first step are performed element-wise. Then with probability 1 − δ over the draws of the
stochastic supergradients:
1
T
T∑
t=1
ft (M
∗)− 1
T
T∑
t=1
ft
(
M (t)
)
≤ 2B∆ˆ
√
2 (m˜ ln m˜)
(
1 + 16 ln 1δ
)
T
whereM∗ ∈ M is an arbitrary reference matrix.
Proof. The same reasoning as was used to prove Corollary 2 from Theorem 6 applies here (but starting from Theo-
rem 7).
Lemma 9. Let Λ := ∆m˜ be the m˜-dimensional simplex, defineM := {M ∈ Rm˜×m˜ : ∀i ∈ [m˜] .M:,i ∈ ∆m˜} as the
set of all left-stochastic m˜× m˜ matrices, and take f1, f2, . . . : Λ → R to be a sequence of concave functions that we
wish to maximize.
Define the step size η =
√
m˜ ln m˜/TB2
∆ˆ
, where B∆ˆ ≥
∥∥∥∆ˆ(t)∥∥∥
∞
is a uniform upper bound on the∞-norms of the
stochastic supergradients. Suppose that we perform T iterations of the following update, starting from the matrix
M (1) with all elements equal to 1/m˜:
λ(t) =fixM (t)
A(t) =∆ˆ(t)
(
λ(t)
)T
M˜ (t+1) =M (t) ⊙ . exp
(
ηA(t)
)
M
(t+1)
:,i =M˜
(t+1)
:,i /
∥∥∥M˜ (t+1):,i ∥∥∥
1
where fixM is a stationary distribution of M (i.e. a λ ∈ Λ such that Mλ = λ—such always exists, since M
is left-stochastic), E
[
−∆ˆ(t) | λ(t)
]
∈ ∂ (−ft(λ(t))), i.e. ∆ˆ(t) is a stochastic supergradient of ft at λ(t), and the
multiplication and exponentiation of the third step are performed element-wise. Then with probability 1 − δ over the
draws of the stochastic supergradients:
1
T
T∑
t=1
ft
(
M∗λ(t)
)
− 1
T
T∑
t=1
ft
(
λ(t)
)
≤ 2B∆ˆ
√
2 (m˜ ln m˜)
(
1 + 16 ln 1δ
)
T
whereM∗ ∈ M is an arbitrary left-stochastic reference matrix.
Proof. The same reasoning as was used to prove Lemma 8 from Corollary 2 applies here (but starting from Corol-
lary 4).
C.3 Two-Player Convergence Rates
Lemma 1. (Algorithm 1) Suppose that Λ and R are as in Theorem 1, and define the upper bound B∆ ≥
maxt∈[T ]
∥∥∥∆(t)λ ∥∥∥
2
.
If we run Algorithm 1 with the step size ηλ := R/B∆
√
2T , then the result satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1 for:
ǫ = ρ+RB∆
√
2
T
where ρ is the error associated with the oracle Oρ.
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Algorithm 3 Optimizes the Lagrangian formulation (Definition 1) in the convex setting. The parameterR is the radius
of the Lagrange multiplier space Λ :=
{
λ ∈ Rm+ : ‖λ‖1 ≤ R
}
, and the functions ΠΘ and ΠΛ project their arguments
onto Θ and Λ (respectively) w.r.t. the Euclidean norm.
StochasticLagrangian (R ∈ R+,L : Θ× Λ→ R, T ∈ N, ηθ, ηλ ∈ R+):
1 Initialize θ(1) = 0, λ(1) = 0 // Assumes 0 ∈ Θ
2 For t ∈ [T ]:
3 Let ∆ˇ
(t)
θ be a stochastic subgradient of L
(
θ(t), λ(t)
)
w.r.t. θ
4 Let∆
(t)
λ be a stochastic gradient of L
(
θ(t), λ(t)
)
w.r.t. λ
5 Update θ(t+1) = ΠΘ
(
θ(t) − ηθ∆ˇ(t)θ
)
// Projected SGD updates . . .
6 Update λ(t+1) = ΠΛ
(
λ(t) + ηλ∆
(t)
λ
)
// . . .
7 Return θ(1), . . . , θ(T ) and λ(1), . . . , λ(T )
Proof. Applying Corollary 1 to the optimization over λ gives:
1
T
T∑
t=1
L
(
θ(t), λ∗
)
− 1
T
T∑
t=1
L
(
θ(t), λ(t)
)
≤ BΛB∆
√
2
T
By the definition of Oρ (Definition 3):
1
T
T∑
t=1
L
(
θ(t), λ∗
)
− inf
θ∗∈Θ
1
T
T∑
t=1
L
(
θ∗, λ(t)
)
≤ ρ+BΛB∆
√
2
T
Using the linearity of L in λ, the fact that BΛ = R, and the definitions of θ¯ and λ¯, yields the claimed result.
Lemma 10. (Algorithm 3) Suppose that Θ is a compact convex set, Λ and R are as in Theorem 1, and that the
objective and constraint functions g0, g1, . . . , gm are convex. Define the three upper bounds BΘ ≥ maxθ∈Θ ‖θ‖2,
B∆ˇ ≥ maxt∈[T ]
∥∥∥∆ˇ(t)θ ∥∥∥
2
, and B∆ ≥ maxt∈[T ]
∥∥∥∆(t)λ ∥∥∥
2
.
If we run Algorithm 3 with the step sizes ηθ := BΘ/B∆ˇ
√
2T and ηλ := R/B∆
√
2T , then the result satisfies the
conditions of Theorem 1 for:
ǫ = 2 (BΘB∆ˇ +RB∆)
√
1 + 16 ln 2δ
T
with probability 1− δ over the draws of the stochastic (sub)gradients.
Proof. Applying Corollary 3 to the two optimizations (over θ and λ) gives that with probability 1− 2δ′ over the draws
of the stochastic (sub)gradients:
1
T
T∑
t=1
L
(
θ(t), λ(t)
)
− 1
T
T∑
t=1
L
(
θ∗, λ(t)
)
≤2BΘB∆ˇ
√
1 + 16 ln 1δ′
T
1
T
T∑
t=1
L
(
θ(t), λ∗
)
− 1
T
T∑
t=1
L
(
θ(t), λ(t)
)
≤2BΛB∆
√
1 + 16 ln 1δ′
T
Adding these inequalities, taking δ = 2δ′, using the linearity of L in λ, the fact that BΛ = R, and the definitions of θ¯
and λ¯, yields the claimed result.
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Algorithm 4 Optimizes the proxy-Lagrangian formulation (Definition 2) in the non-convex setting via the use of an
approximate Bayesian optimization oracle Oρ (Definition 3, but with g˜is instead of gis in the linear combination
defining f ) for the θ-player, with the λ-player minimizing swap regret. The fixM operation on line 3 results in a
stationary distribution ofM (i.e. a λ ∈ Λ such thatMλ = λ, which can be derived from the top eigenvector).
OracleProxyLagrangian
(Lθ,Lλ : Θ×∆m+1 → R,Oρ : (Θ→ R)→ Θ, T ∈ N, ηλ ∈ R+):
1 InitializeM (1) ∈ R(m+1)×(m+1) withMi,j = 1/ (m+ 1)
2 For t ∈ [T ]:
3 Let λ(t) = fixM (t) // Stationary distribution ofM (t)
4 Let θ(t) = Oρ
(Lθ (·, λ(t))) // Oracle optimization
5 Let∆
(t)
λ be a gradient of Lλ
(
θ(t), λ(t)
)
w.r.t. λ
6 Update M˜ (t+1) = M (t) ⊙ . exp
(
ηλ∆
(t)
λ
(
λ(t)
)T)
// ⊙ and . exp are element-wise
7 ProjectM
(t+1)
:,i = M˜
(t+1)
:,i /
∥∥∥M˜ (t+1):,i ∥∥∥
1
for i ∈ [m+ 1] // Column-wise projection w.r.t. KL divergence
8 Return θ(1), . . . , θ(T ) and λ(1), . . . , λ(T )
Lemma 11. (Algorithm 4) Suppose that M and Λ are as in Theorem 2, and define the upper bound
B∆ ≥ maxt∈[T ]
∥∥∥∆(t)λ ∥∥∥
∞
.
If we run Algorithm 4 with the step size ηλ :=
√
(m+ 1) ln (m+ 1) /TB2∆, then the result satisfies satisfies the
conditions of Theorem 2 for:
ǫθ =ρ
ǫλ =2B∆
√
(m+ 1) ln (m+ 1)
T
where ρ is the error associated with the oracle Oρ.
Proof. Applying Lemma 8 to the optimization over λ (with m˜ := m+ 1) gives:
1
T
T∑
t=1
Lλ
(
θ(t),M∗λ(t)
)
− 1
T
T∑
t=1
Lλ
(
θ(t), λ(t)
)
≤ 2B∆
√
(m+ 1) ln (m+ 1)
T
By the definition of Oρ (Definition 3):
1
T
T∑
t=1
Lθ
(
θ(t), λ(t)
)
− inf
θ∗∈Θ
1
T
T∑
t=1
Lθ
(
θ∗, λ(t)
)
≤ ρ
Using the definitions of θ¯ and λ¯ yields the claimed result.
Lemma 4. (Algorithm 2) Suppose that Θ is a compact convex set, M and Λ are as in Theorem 2, and that the
objective and proxy constraint functions g0, g˜1, . . . , g˜m are convex (but not g1, . . . , gm). Define the three upper bounds
BΘ ≥ maxθ∈Θ ‖θ‖2, B∆ˇ ≥ maxt∈[T ]
∥∥∥∆ˇ(t)θ ∥∥∥
2
, and B∆ ≥ maxt∈[T ]
∥∥∥∆(t)λ ∥∥∥
∞
.
If we run Algorithm 2 with the step sizes ηθ := BΘ/B∆ˇ
√
2T and ηλ :=
√
(m+ 1) ln (m+ 1) /TB2∆, then the result
satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2 for:
ǫθ =2BΘB∆ˇ
√
1 + 16 ln 2δ
T
ǫλ =2B∆
√
2 (m+ 1) ln (m+ 1)
(
1 + 16 ln 2δ
)
T
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with probability 1− δ over the draws of the stochastic (sub)gradients.
Proof. Applying Corollary 3 to the optimization over θ, and Lemma 9 to that over λ (with m˜ := m + 1), gives that
with probability 1− 2δ′ over the draws of the stochastic (sub)gradients:
1
T
T∑
t=1
Lθ
(
θ(t), λ(t)
)
− 1
T
T∑
t=1
Lθ
(
θ∗, λ(t)
)
≤2BΘB∆ˇ
√
1 + 16 ln 1δ′
T
1
T
T∑
t=1
Lλ
(
θ(t),M∗λ(t)
)
− 1
T
T∑
t=1
Lλ
(
θ(t), λ(t)
)
≤2B∆
√
2 (m+ 1) ln (m+ 1)
(
1 + 16 ln 1δ′
)
T
Taking δ = 2δ′, and using the definitions of θ¯ and λ¯, yields the claimed result.
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